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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MOTION T O RECONSIDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Fix a Location for the Right-of- Way 
In their brief, the Appellees (hereinafter "Radakoviches") tacitly admit that the 
order granting summary judgment, which they prepared and which the trial court judge 
signed, is fatally defective. Although they attempt to claim that the width, length, and 
location of the right-of-way are "clear and need[] no 'clarification,'" the Radakoviches 
also acknowledge that, during oral argument on the motion to reconsider, they offered to 
have "Cornaby locat[e] the placement of fences marking the sixty foot wide right of 
way." (Appellee's Brief at 33-34.) The transcript of the hearing reveals the 
Radakoviches' offer: 
Now, they've brought this motion for reconsideration coupled with a 
motion to clarify. I think this is much ado about nothing. We know that 
there is a road. A road exists. The order which Counsel - which the 
defendants reviewed before it was signed says that a right-of-way should be 
60 feet from the entrance to its exit. Now essentially it's a straight line. 
If the defendants are unwilling to cooperate in the placing of these 
fences to mark the 60-foot right-of-way, the Court should do what many 
Courts typically do; and we'd be happy to provide a surveyor to mark the 
middle of the road from top to bottom, and measure 30 feet on each side, if 
the defendants insist on a meets and bounds description. That's the easiest 
way to settle it; and it's not a problem. It's commonly done. 
(R. at 476, 31-32.) 
The Radakoviches cannot consistently maintain the supposed "clarity" of the 
right-of-way at issue when they have openly admitted (a) that the order granting 
summary judgment offers no description locating the right-of-way and (b) that the order 
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must therefore be clarified before the boundaries of the right-of-way may be located. The 
Radakoviches even went so far as to suggest a surveyor locate the right-of-way because 
the order left the matter unclear. Given that the Radakoviches had expressly requested 
that the Court "define[] [the right-of-way] by metes and bounds" {see R. at 34) because 
they claimed to "have attempted to arrange for fences to be built to mark the 60 foot wide 
right of way, but have been prevented from doing so by the [Cornabys]," (R. at 50), it is 
remarkable that they now claim an order setting forth only the most nebulous references 
as to the location of a right-of-way, without any legal description at all, nevertheless 
constitutes a "clear" judicial order granting them the relief they requested. 
As discussed in the Cornabys5 original brief, both this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have recently addressed the very issue raised in Radakoviches' Amended 
Complaint. Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App 
256, 97 P.3d 697, a case decided by this Court, turned on the validity of a reserved 
easement the location of which was not described in the original reservation. The trial 
court had ruled the easement invalid, but this Court reversed, explaining that "[t]he 
failure of an easement description to specify details, such as the exact location ... does 
not render the easement excessively vague or unenforceable." 2004 UT App 256, \ 10 
(quoting Egidi v. Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. Ct. 1993)).1 
1
 Relevant to the present dispute was this Court's observation that "[w]hen a deed 
creating an easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts commonly construe 
the location and dimensions of the intended easement to conform with the location and 
dimensions of the road." 2004 UT App 256, [^12 (quoting Mitchell v. Chance, 149 
S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). In the present case, of course, the trial court did 
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The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision. See Evans v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432. The Supreme Court 
characterized the judicial function in unfixed easement cases as an exercise similar to 
contractual "gap-filling." Id. (citing Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)). 
Ultimately, after considering the necessity of ensuring that judicial gap-filling does not 
alter the scope of the servitude bargained for, id. at f^ 19, the Supreme Court adopted an 
approach that places the power to locate an unfixed servitude in the owner of the servient 
estate, id. at ^20. Under this "practical approach to the problem," the Supreme Court 
observed, 
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location 
for the easement. If the servient owner fails to make such a designation 
within a reasonable period, the easement holder may select a reasonable 
route. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a court may specify a 
location for the easement. 
Id. at ]|21 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land, \ 7.02[2][a] (rev. ed. 2000)). This arrangement for the placement of an 
unfixed servitude, the Court concluded, "removes the issue of whether location selection 
is an essential term from the field of battle with neither side sustaining injury." Id. at 19. 
In the present dispute, the Cornabys have denied the existence of a 60-foot 
easement and resisted the Radakoviches' unilateral attempts to fix the location of the 
easement. In response, the Radakoviches brought this action requesting the trial court to 
fix the location of the easement. The trial court did not do so. Thus, the Cornabys' 
not construe the right-of-way to conform with the dimensions of the existing road, but 
instead redefined the existing road to conform with its reading of the right-of-way. 
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quarrel is not with the enforcement of an unfixed right-of-way, but with the trial court's 
failure to have fulfilled its gap-filling duty under the Evans rule. Given that Cornaby and 
Radakoviches cannot reach an agreement as to the situation of the right-of-way, the trial 
court's duty was to specify a location. This, however, the trial court utterly failed to do, 
and, the Cornabys, seeking to repair the omission, brought the Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider. 
B. The Failure to Fix a Right-of-Way is a Reason Justifying Relief from the 
Summary Judgment Order 
The Cornabys argued in their brief that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
did not reconsider its summary judgment order to fix the boundaries of the underlying 
right-of-way. In response, the Radakoviches repeatedly claim that the Cornabys "never 
presented any facts showing 'extraordinary circumstances' which could purportedly 
justify a Motion to Reconsider." (Appellee's Brief at 17; see also id. at 11, 12, & 18.) 
They also claim that the Cornabys "did not present the trial court with the available 
evidence [of the irreconcilable right-of-way descriptions] which [they] now seek[] to 
present on appeal." (Id. at 26-27.) They also repeatedly claim that the Cornabys "never 
provided any 'reason' to justify relief to the trial court. (Id. at 17; see also id. at 11, 12.) 
Finally, they claim that "[although the Appellants' Brief generically refers to Rule 
60(b)(6), [the Cornabys] fail[] to cite any Rule 60(b) 'reason' justifying the Motion to 
Reconsider." (Id. at 18; see also id. at 24.) This description of the underlying procedural 
history is demonstrably inaccurate. 
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L The Cornabys Did Identify A Reason Justifying Relief 
As the Cornabys noted, cited, and folly discussed on pages 17 and 18 of their 
Appellants' Brief, a mistaken easement description in a judgment constitutes a "reason 
justifying relief from the operation of [a] judgment." See Kungler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 
270, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This specific case and its reasoning were also 
presented, briefed, and argued to the trial court. {See R. at 441-44.) Moreover, in their 
Appellants' Brief, the Cornabys pointed out that, because the mistake in failing to define 
the easement was due to the mistakes of the court, the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to correct the judgment. (See Appellants' Brief at 18 (citing Oseguera v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, f 12, 68 P.3d 1008).) The Radakoviches' claim, 
therefore, that the Cornabys never identified any reason justifying relief is inaccurate, at 
best. 
2. The Cornabys Presented Facts and Arguments Supporting the 
Reason to the Trial Court 
The Radakoviches are equally inaccurate in their claim that the Cornabys did not 
present evidence to the trial court demonstrating the problem with the order. The trial 
court had before it a picture almost identical to the picture incorporated into the 
Cornabys' Appellants' Brief at page 6 (see R. at 289, 294), together with a plotted legal 
description of the right-of-way described in the relevant deeds (see R. at 405). Not only 
were these pieces of evidence in the record, but the deeds themselves were in the record 
as well. (See R. at 169, 117.) Additionally, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Memorandum Decision of the 1968 Seventh District Court case identifying the 
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properties, the right-of-way, and the respective legal descriptions of each were before the 
trial court too. (See R. at 110-12, 119-24). And, the Cornabys specifically argued that 
the descriptions were irreconcilably in conflict and that the Cornabys could not identify 
where the right-of-way was to be measured from. (See R. at 347-48; 442-44 476, 7-9, 13-
14, 16-19.) The Radakoviches, moreover, responded explicitly to these arguments. (See 
R. at 382-83; 476, 31-32.) The Radakoviches, once again, cannot rationally assert the 
absence of arguments to which they have expressly addressed responses. Rational or not, 
however, the Radakoviches are, at best, simply incorrect to assert that the Cornabys did 
not raise the issue with, or present facts to, the trial court relating to the irreconcilability 
issue. 
3. The Radakoviches Have Failed To Explain Why Failing to Fix a 
Location of a Right-of- Way is Not a Reason Justifying Relief 
What is most significant about the Radakoviches' arguments is that they never 
point to any case law or other argument suggesting that a trial court's failure to specify 
the easement's location is not a reason justifying relief. The closest they ever come is 
their statement in the oral argument referenced in part LA. above that they would be 
willing to allow the Cornabys to fix the location of the easement. But this, of course, 
being an admission that the Cornabys' requested clarification was justified, actually 
militates against the Radakoviches' unsupported assertions to the contrary. 
4. The Motion Was a Proper Motion 
Somewhat related to the arguments raised about the Cornabys' alleged failure to 
identify the reason justifying relief is the Radakoviches' implicit argument that, because 
PaeeS 
the Cornabys did not identify until oral argument the exact Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
(URCP) permitting a motion to reconsider, the motion was somehow improper. As the 
Cornabys argued in response to the Radakoviches motion for summary disposition, 
however, while it is true that the URCP does not include a provision on motions for 
reconsideration, it is entirely irrelevant since it is equally true that the URCP nowhere 
forbids such a motion. To the contrary, in J. V. Hatch Const, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court rejected the argument that the Rules' silence regarding 
motions to reconsider rendered such motions per se improper: 
We quickly dispose of [the] argument that [the] motion for reconsideration 
was inappropriately before the trial court because no such motion exists 
under the rules of civil procedure. While that much is true, a motion so 
titled may still be properly heard if it could have been brought under a 
different rule, i.e. Rules 54(a), 59(a), or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but was improperly characterized. 
Id. at 11 (citing Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (Utah 1994) 
(emphasis added)). A (mis)characterization of the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider—whether in the caption or the text of the supporting memorandum—as 
falling without the ambit of the URCP is thus of no moment, as it is well established that 
"[i]t is "the substance . . . of a motion [that] is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion." In re Adoption of Baby K, 967 P.2d 947, 949 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
Since the substance of the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is relief from 
judgment on the grounds of the trial court's failure to clarify its award of a right-of-way, 
the Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider falls squarely within the scope of the 
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provisions of URCP Rule 60(b).2 
II. THE CORNABYS ARE APPEALING ONLY THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION. 
The Radakoviches repeatedly argue in their brief that the Comabys are attempting 
to circumvent the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure by arguing the underlying 
merits of the summary judgment order rather than arguing the district court's order on 
motion for reconsideration. Of course, as this Court is aware, this very issue was argued 
when the Radakoviches sought summary disposition and lost. (A copy of this Court's 
Order denying the motion for summary disposition is appended as Tab A in the 
Appendix.) 
As the Comabys pointed out in response to the Radakoviches' motion for 
summary disposition, and as fully attested in their Appellants' Brief, the Comabys do not 
seek to have this Court revisit the trial court's summary judgment order (although they 
naturally wish that the decision had been otherwise—such is the nature of litigation). 
Indeed, the Cornabys are well aware of the impropriety of attempting by means of a 60(b) 
motion to circumvent the rules governing appeals. See, e.g., Franklin Covey Client Sales 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ^ 9, 2 P.3d 451. InFranklin Covey, the defendant, Melvin, 
after the dismissal of his untimely appeal, filed two motions for relief from judgment: 
one on the grounds of mistake, under Rule 60(b)(1), and one on grounds of newly 
discovered evidence, 60(b)(2), and misrepresentation, 60(b)(3). Upon their denial, 
2
 This argument, of course, should come as no surprise to the Radakoviches since 
the Cornabys clearly made the argument in the Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum 
filed prior to the Court's order being entered. (See generally R. at 448-57.) 
Melvin appealed his two 60(b) motions. Unfortunately for Melvin, his 60(b) fa9ade 
could not conceal what was, in reality, a transparent attempt to improperly revisit issues 
in the underlying judgment which the tardiness of his original appeal had barred him 
from addressing. 
The Court was not fooled, however, and noted at the outset the limited scope of 
appellate review of the denial of 60(b) motions: 
An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial 
or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the 
merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate 
review of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 
60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry into the merits of 
the underlying judgment or order must be the subject of a direct appeal 
from that judgment or order. 
2000 UT App 110 at [^19 (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 60.68[3] (3d ed.1999)) (emphasis omitted). Focusing accordingly, the Court 
discovered that Melvin's 60(b)(1) motion did not address inadvertent clerical errors, but 
sought to review mistakes of law. The "proper avenue to redress mistakes of law 
committed by the trial judge," the Court pointed out, is "an appeal or motion for new 
trial, rather than a 60(b) motion." Id. at %L\. Melvin's second motion, held by the Court 
to be meritless, presented no new evidence to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b)(2) 
nor any hint of the misrepresentation needed to trigger relief under 60(b)(3). Id. at Tfl[26-
28. 
Unlike Mr. Melvin's pretended 60(b) motions, however, turning back to the 
present dispute, the Cornabys' appeal of the rejection of the Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider does not challenge the understanding or application of the law as set forth in 
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the trial court's summary judgment order.3 Rather, the appeal is of the trial court's abuse 
of discretion in refusing to resolve an incomprehensibility. 
As noted in the Cornabys' Appellants' Brief, the trial court's order, in short, 
essentially grants to Radakoviches a right-of-way, 60 feet wide (based upon the spurious 
deed description) along the length of the existing fenced right-of-way (which has not 
historically been of a uniform 60-foot width throughout), without bothering to specify 
where this 60 feet is to be measured from. In this, the trial court erred grievously. Are the 
parties to measure the mandated 60 feet, for instance, as 30 feet on either side of the 
centerline of the existing access road? or 60 feet from the eastern boundary? or 30 feet on 
either side of a line drawn at the whim of the Radakoviches? This point, unaddressed by 
the trial court, should be the main priority in a dispute over the location of an undescribed 
right-of-way. 
In short, the Radakoviches have been granted a 60-foot right-of-way which is 
Here it should be noted that the Appellees' reliance on Bonneville Billing & 
Collection v. Torres, 2000 UT App 338, 15 P.3d 112, is similarly inapposite. In 
Bonneville, the plaintiff openly sought to use the appeal of a motion to reconsider to 
attack the findings entered as part of a default judgment, "contending this [was] the only 
means to present the issues for appeal," id. at f3. The Court properly dismissed the 
appeal on jurisdictional grounds: a motion seeking to alter or amend findings must be 
brought as a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings or a Rule 59(e) motion to amend 
judgment. Such motions must be filed within ten days of the challenged findings or 
judgment. Bonneville's motion, however, was filed 46 days after default judgment was 
entered. 
In the present case, however, the Cornabys are not attempting Bonneville's back-
door approach to challenging the underlying judgment on appeal. Moreover, the 
Cornabys' Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is plainly not a Rule 52(b) motion, since 
it does not challenge the trial court's findings; it seeks instead to discover a way to reify 
what is otherwise an Order with which no one can reasonably comply. (And in any event, 
summary judgment's do not have "findings," merely "a brief written statement of the 
ground[s] for its decision . . . . " URCP Rule 52(a).) 
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undefined. The end result of the confusion created by the summary judgment order is 
that the parties will end up back before a judge seeking some sort of explanation. In 
order to avoid that inevitability, the Cornabys filed the Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider, asking the trial court to clarify what it meant in its findings, conclusions, and 
judgment. The Cornabys cannot understand the Radakoviches' vehemence against such 
critical clarification, nor the trial court's apparent belief that clarification is unnecessary, 
but the Cornabys feel bound to seek some kind of remedy for this conundrum while it is 
still remediable. Nevertheless, the Cornabys seek review only of the trial court's decision 
not to render such clarification as they asked for in their Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider; they do not ask this Court to address the underlying judgment. 
III. THE CORNABYS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
The Radakoviches, citing Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998), also claim 
that the Cornabys waived their right to bring the motion to reconsider because the 
Cornabys allegedly "assented . . . without objection" to the "form of the Summary 
Judgment Order" before it was entered by the trial court. (Appellee's Brief at 29.) 
However, Evans v. State is clearly inapposite to this case. 
In Evans v. State, the Plaintiffs filed petitions to quash administrative civil 
investigative demands (CIDs) issued by the Antitrust Division of the State of Utah. Id. at 
179. At the hearing on the motions, the trial court ruled from the bench that the State had 
not met its burden to establish "probable cause" for the issuances of the CIDs. Id. at 180. 
However, the statutorily imposed burden for the issuance of a CID was merely 
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"reasonable cause." Id. Despite the trial court's ruling, the Plaintiffs prepared an order 
that stated the State failed to establish reasonable cause. Id. The State did not object to 
the proposed order despite this inclusion of the language inconsistent with the trial 
court's oral ruling. See id. Because the State had failed to object to the written order as 
inconsistent with the trial court's oral findings, the Supreme Court ruled that "the State 
waived its right to challenge the order in this regard on appeal." Id. The Court based its 
holding upon the standard that it applies in such cases: "Regardless of the language used 
during the hearing, the language in the court's final written order controls, and we will 
presume the order is correct unless affirmatively shown otherwise." Id. In 2004, this 
Court succinctly explained the Evans v. State decision: "To preserve for appeal the issue 
of whether the written order of the court is in conformity with what transpired on the 
record, a party must first object to the form of the documents pursuant to [URCP 7(f)]." 
Nigohosian v. Nigohosian, 2004 UT App. 116, 2004 WL 797721, at *1 (citing Evans, 
963 P.2d at 180). (A copy of the unpublished decision of the Court is appended to this 
brief as Tab 2.) 
The Evans v. State rule, however, is clearly does not apply to the present dispute. 
The Cornabys do not claim any disparity exists between the conclusions of the court on 
the record and the final documents the Radakoviches prepared. In fact, because the trial 
court's ruling did not include any finding as to the location of the right-of-way, the 
documents prepared by the Radakoviches—which likewise fail to delineate the right-of-
way's location—could not conflict with the trial court's decision. {Compare R. at 300 
with R. at 304-09.) Instead, the Comabys simply claim that the Order and Findings & 
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Conclusions, which clearly reflect the trial court's ruling, are impossible to enforce and 
must be reconsidered. Accordingly, the Cornabys did not waive their right to bring a 
motion for reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the Cornabys' Rule 60(b) (6) Motion to Clarify and/or 
Reconsider constituted a clear abuse of discretion. For the reasons given herein, the 
Cornabys respectfully request that this Court (1) reverse the trial court's August 31, 2005, 
Order denying the Cornabys' Motion, (2) set aside the judgment, and (3) remand this 
matter to the trial court with instructions that it specifically identify the location of the 
right-of-way at issue. 
DATED this V * day of April, 2006 
sott Crook 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
David Maddox 
Attorney for Defendants 
4816-7844-9920 CO 010 001 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this »ft^ day of April, 2006,1 caused to be sent via first-
class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants' 
Reply Brief, addressed as follows: 
John H. Romney 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo,Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
D. sSt t Crook 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
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Order Denying Motion for Summary Disposition,
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Case No. 20050911-C A (Utah Ct. App, Nov. 29, 2005) l a b A 
Nigohosian v. Nigohosian,, 2004 UT App 116, 2004 WL 797721 Tab B 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
. 00O00 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 29 2005 
Robert Radakovich, 
individually, and Robert 
Radakovich and Ellen R. 
Radakovich, Trustees of the 
Robert Radakovich Marital and 
Family Trust, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Mattie Cornaby, Al Cornaby, 
individuals, William Argyle 
Cornaby Trust and Mattie 
Cornaby Trust, Jay Barney 
Cornaby, Dale Barney, Gaylene 
C. Rosenthal, Albert Cornaby, 
Trustees 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20050911-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne. 
This matter is before the court on Appellees' motion for 
summary disposition. Appellees argue that this court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Appellants' notice of 
appeal was untimely. See Utah R. App. P. 10(a) (1) . 
Appellants filed a "motion to clarify and/or reconsider" on 
March 11, 2005. The trial court denied this motion on August 31, 
2 005. Appellants subsequently filed a notice of appeal on 
September 28. Appellants claim that the "motion to clarify 
and/or reconsider" was filed pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants also concede that they only 
appeal from the denial of this motion. 
We construe the "motion to clarify and/or reconsider" as a 
motion filed pursuant to rule 60(b)(6). See Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(6). Therefore, the appeal from the denial of this motion 
was timely filed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). While the appeal is 
necessarily narrow in scope, see Franklin Covev Client Sales; 
Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,119, 2 P.3d 451, this court has 
jurisdiction to decide it. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary disposition 
is denied. 
xP DATED this A * day of November, 2005 
FOR THE COURT: 
William A, Thorne Jr., Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on November 29, 2005, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
JOHN H ROMNEY 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 N 100 E 
PO BOX 888 
PROVO UT 84603-0888 
DAVID MADDOX 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
9160 S 300 W STE 6A 
SANDY UT 84070 
D. SCOTT CROOK 
SCOTT M ELLSWORTH 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC 
215 S STATE ST STE 650 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this November 29, 2005. 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20050911 
District Court No. 020700486 
TabB 
V&sOaw 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 1 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 797721 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 116 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 797721 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Margaret NIGOHOSIAN, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert NIGOHOSIAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020606-CA. 
April 15,2004. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department; The 
Honorable William B. Bohling. 
Douglas G. Mortensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Jay L. Kessler, Magna, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, and 
ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Husband appeals the decree of divorce and 
supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law 
signed and filed by the court. He asserts on appeal 
that the documents are not in conformity with the 
agreements stated on the record at a pretrial hearing 
before the court. 
In February 2002, the trial court held a pretrial 
hearing in this divorce case. At the hearing, the 
parties reached agreement on many key issues and 
stated the agreements on the record. Wife's counsel 
was assigned to prepare documents reflecting the 
result of the hearing. 
Wife's counsel served a divorce decree and 
supporting findings of fact and conclusions of law 
on Husband's counsel, accompanied by a signed 
certificate of service. Receiving no timely 
objections to the documents, the trial court signed 
the documents. The documents were filed with the 
clerk on June 19, 2002. 
Husband timely filed a notice of appeal. He also 
filed a motion to set aside the judgment, or to 
correct clerical error, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(a) and (b). [FN1] In both his rule 60 
motion and appeal, Husband asserts that the 
documents entered by the trial court do not conform 
to what transpired on the record in the February 
hearing. 
FN1. A trial court has jurisdiction to 
consider a motion under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) while an appeal is 
pending. See Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 
757 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Husband's rule 60 motion was a 
proceeding separate from the proceedings 
leading to the divorce decree appealed in 
this case. This court's "power of review is 
strictly limited to the record presented on 
appeal." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 
99,K 16, 17 P.3d 1110. Although some 
confusion exists among the parties, the 
record of the proceedings in the parallel 
rule 60 motion is not before this court on 
the appeal of the divorce decree, and is not 
considered for the purposes of this appeal. 
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that counsel for a party obtaining a ruling 
shall draft and file with the court a "proposed order, 
judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling." 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(l). Copies of the 
proposed documents must be served on the 
opposing party. See id. R4-504(2). The opposing 
party must notify the court and counsel of any 
objections to the documents within five days of 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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service. See id. This presents opposing counsel with 
the opportunity to review proposed documents and 
assure that they are "in conformity" with what 
transpired in court. Id. R4-504(l). 
Husband waived his opportunity to challenge on 
appeal whether the decree, findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law were in conformity with the 
agreements reached on the record in the February 
hearing because he failed to object timely to the 
form of the documents under rule 4-504. See Evans 
v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1998). To 
preserve for appeal the issue of whether the written 
order of the court is in conformity with what 
transpired on the record, a party must first object to 
the form of the documents pursuant to rule 4- 504. 
See id. (holding State waived issue of inconsistent 
language in court's written order because of failure 
to timely object to the language under rule 4-504). 
Husband argues that he did not waive the issue of 
the conformity of the documents to the record. He 
asserts that his trial attorney explained why there 
were no timely objections filed at a motion hearing 
on October 25, 2002. However, that hearing is part 
of the subsequent rule 60 proceeding and is not 
before this court. 
Husband also argues that there was no waiver 
because the documents did not have an "approved 
as to form" line signifying review and approval. 
However, implying the necessity of an approval line 
is contrary to the rule. The rule squarely places the 
burden to object, not to approve, on counsel, with a 
prescribed time in which to do so. See Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. R4-504(2). [FN2] 
FN2. Husband also asserts that no 
objection to the documents was necessary 
to preserve appeal under Dugan v. Jones, 
724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). Both Dugan 
and rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure state that no trial objection is 
necessary to preserve for appeal a question 
of sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
finding. See Dugan, 724 P.2d at 956. Here, 
however, the challenge is to the conformity 
of the documents with the stipulations 
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entered on the record, not sufficiency of 
the evidence. Dugan is thus inapplicable. 
*2 Furthermore, as a factual matter, Husband has 
not affirmatively shown that the decree and findings 
of fact and conclusions of law were inconsistent 
with what transpired at the hearing in February 
2002. See Evans, 963 P.2d at 180 (stating appellate 
courts will presume language in trial court's order is 
correct unless affirmatively shown otherwise). 
Husband offers conclusory and self-serving 
statements that the parties' intent was different than 
what is reflected, supported only by his own 
proposed amended documents. Additionally, one of 
his challenges to the documents, the waiver of 
past-due amounts and attorney fees, appears clearly 
set forth in finding of fact number 24 and 
conclusion of law number 19. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 797721 (Utah 
App.), 2004 UT App 116 
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